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Activating Actavis: Economic Issues in 
Applying the Rule of Reason to Reverse 
Payment Settlements 
Sumanth Addanki, PhD* &  
Henry N. Butler, JD, PhD** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court reversed the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision, rejecting the so-called scope-of-the-
patent test for reverse payment settlements in Hatch-Waxman 
pharmaceutical litigation.2 It also rejected the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and Third Circuit’s arguments for 
presumptive illegality of reverse payments, declaring that the 
rule of reason is the appropriate framework in which to 
evaluate such settlements.3 In arguments before the Supreme 
Court, Actavis supported the scope-of-the-patent test, which 
would have insulated most reverse payment settlements from 
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antitrust scrutiny,4 while the FTC argued that reverse 
payments should be presumptively unlawful.5 In declaring that 
the rule of reason should govern the antitrust analysis of 
reserve payment settlements, the Supreme Court explicitly 
rejected the arguments of both parties.6 
Proponents of the scope-of-the-patent test focus on the 
patentee’s right, under patent law, to exclude others.7 They 
argue, therefore, that reverse payment settlements should be 
presumed to be lawful as long as the settlement does not 
impose competitive restraints that go beyond the scope of the 
patent.8 On the other hand, those who advocate that reverse 
payment settlements should be considered presumptively 
unlawful maintain that such settlements nearly always have 
anticompetitive effects.9 In fact, reverse payments have the 
potential both to harm and to benefit consumers. Consequently, 
the scope-of-the-patent test is likely to allow some settlements 
that are in fact anticompetitive, while treating reverse 
payments as presumptively illegal is likely to prevent some 
settlements that are procompetitive or competitively neutral. 
The Supreme Court rightly rejected both approaches and 
mandated that lower courts take a more nuanced approach, 
analyzing reverse payment settlements under the rule of 
reason. 
In doing so, the Court provided little guidance on how such 
analyses should be carried out, leaving it to lower courts to 
develop the analytical framework in which to assess these 
settlement agreements. In this Article, we discuss the economic 
and legal underpinnings of the relevant issues and offer some 
guidance on the key economic questions that lower courts will 
need to assess as they proceed under the rule of reason. 
                                                          
 4. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2223 (2013) (No. 12-416). 
 5. Id. at 9. 
 6. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38. 
 7. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc. at 18, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 662705. 
 8. Cf. id. at 46–47. 
 9. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 15–24, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 267027. 
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II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE COMPETING POSITIONS 
AND THE COURT’S RULING 
A. THE FTC’S ARGUMENT THAT REVERSE PAYMENT 
SETTLEMENTS SHOULD BE PRESUMPTIVELY UNLAWFUL 
The FTC argued for both a per se rule and a quick look 
approach to reverse settlements. The FTC’s primary argument 
was that reverse-payment agreements should be treated as 
presumptively unlawful because they are similar to unlawful 
horizontal restraints of trade.10 Specifically, the FTC contended 
that reverse payments have the anticompetitive effect of 
“[r]aising price, reducing output, and dividing markets.”11 
The FTC claimed that the patentee has the ability and the 
incentive to pay the would-be generic entrant more than the 
generic firm would have earned if it had entered into the 
market: 
In the pharmaceutical industry . . . standard economic theory 
predicts that a brand-name manufacturer’s monopoly profits will 
greatly exceed the combined profits that the brand-name and 
generic manufacturers could earn if they competed against each 
other for sales of the same drug. The brand-name manufacturer’s 
monopoly profits are large enough to pay its would-be generic 
competitors more than they could hope to earn if they entered the 
market, while still leaving the brand-name manufacturer greater 
profits than it could earn in the face of generic competition.12 
The FTC went on to argue that “[i]n substance, a reverse-
payment agreement is a mechanism for inducing the generic 
manufacturer to forgo its own output, as a way to increase the 
manufacturers’ combined profits, at the expense of competition 
and consumer welfare.”13 
The FTC argued for the application of a quick look 
approach to reverse payments because the respondents’ 
conduct closely resembles conduct that is usually or almost 
always harmful to competition.14 Under this approach, the 
agreement would be presumed anticompetitive and the 
defendant would have the burden of providing procompetitive 
justifications for the conduct.15 The FTC contended that 
                                                          
 10. Id. at 15. 
 11. Id. at 20 (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 777 (1999)). 
 12. Id. at 21. 
 13. Id. at 23. 
 14. Id. at 34–35. 
 15. Id. at 33 (citing Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 771). 
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because both parties benefit from monopolistic pricing, there is 
a strong incentive to prolong the period of the brand name’s 
exclusivity.16 A quick look test is also administratively efficient 
because it would not require a full evaluation of the scope of the 
patent and would obviate the need for a costly patent trial 
within an antitrust trial.17 
Acknowledging that public policy generally favors 
settlements, the FTC argued that reverse payments are an 
exception because of their tendency to reduce competition.18 
Moreover, the FTC argued that the scope-of-the-patent test 
ignores the strength of the patent involved.19 Further, the FTC 
looked to the legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act to 
show that Congress intended to promote rapid and timely entry 
of generics into brand-name drug markets.20 In the FTC’s view, 
these goals and purposes would be frustrated if reverse 
payments were routinely allowed to delay generic entry into 
the market.21 
B. ACTAVIS ARGUED FOR THE SCOPE-OF-THE-PATENT TEST 
Actavis argued against the Government’s proposed “quick 
look” test.22 Primarily Actavis argued that the government had 
not shown that reverse payments result in “‘obvious’ and 
‘actual[ ] anticompetitive effects,’”23 citing studies that indicate 
that reverse payments are not always, or even usually, 
anticompetitive.24 
Further, according to Actavis, the Government’s proposed 
rule does not take into account the patent holder’s lawful right 
                                                          
 16. Id. at 34–36. 
 17. Id. at 54–55. 
 18. Id. at 46–49. 
 19. Id. at 44. 
 20. Id. at 3, 30–32. “The Hatch-Waxman Amendments reflect a strong 
congressional policy that favors testing the scope and validity of 
pharmaceutical patents, with a view to realizing the benefits of generic 
competition at the earliest appropriate time.” Id. at 30–31 (citing C. Scott 
Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory 
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1614 (2006)). 
 21. Id. at 30–32. 
 22. Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc. at 16, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 662705. 
 23. Id. at 13 (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771, 775 n.12 
(1999)). 
 24. Id. at 23–25. 
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to exclude competitors.25 Actavis believes that its patent gives 
it the unqualified right to exclude all competition through any 
means it finds necessary, so long as the settlement does not 
exceed the scope of the patent in either length or breadth of the 
patent’s terms.26 Such means, of course, include reverse-
payment settlements of patent infringement suits.27 
Actavis also argued that the Government’s “quick look” 
rule would result in unintended consequences.28 Such a rule 
would chill settlements and induce lengthy and costly 
litigation.29 Moreover, Actavis contended that the 
Government’s rule is so ambiguous that it would cause 
confusion in the industry that would deter the innovation and 
research that leads to new drugs and would limit the number of 
Paragraph IV patent challenges by generic pharmaceutical 
companies.30 
C. ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE GOVERNMENT’S QUICK 
LOOK APPROACH 
The FTC’s desire for a quick look approach is likely to 
result in many decisions that condemn procompetitive 
outcomes or dramatically deter the consummation of 
procompetitive transactions. Reverse payments may, under 
certain circumstances, (1) encourage generic abbreviated new 
drug application filings; (2) allow generic entry earlier than 
would have occurred if the patent had been litigated; (3) protect 
valid pharmaceutical patents from infringement; (4) avoid high 
or excessive litigation costs; and (5) facilitate bona fide side 
deals. Thus, reverse payment settlements may enhance 
efficiency and benefit consumers.31 
                                                          
 25. Id. at 19–20. 
 26. Cf. id. at 12 (“The patent laws provide a patentee (here, the brand-
name drug manufacturer) with a lawful right to exclude alleged infringers. 
This Court’s antitrust precedent recognizes that, so long as the patentee 
operates within the exclusionary bounds of its patent monopoly, the antitrust 
laws do not forbid the patentee’s conduct.” (citations omitted)). 
 27. Id. at 12–13. 
 28. Id. at 39. 
 29. Id. at 39–40. 
 30. Id. at 40. 
 31. For another opinion on why the FTC’s proposed quick look is the 
wrong approach, see Sumanth Addanki, Alan J. Daskin & Christine S. Meyer, 
High Court Brings Economics Back to Pay-for-Delay Analysis, LAW360 (June 
17, 2013), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Law360_
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Addanki, Daskin, and Meyer outline some of the flaws in 
the FTC’s argument.32 They consider a hypothetical patent suit 
in which the objective probability that either party will win the 
litigation is 0.5 (i.e., a fifty percent chance for each party).33 
Assume, for simplicity, that discovery is complete and that the 
outcome of the trial will be known quickly. In that case, the 
expected date of generic entry under litigation would be half 
the time left until the expiration of the patent.34 It might seem, 
therefore, that both parties would be willing to settle the 
litigation, without any side payments, by agreeing that the 
generic will enter at that date: if the patent runs for another 
ten years, the parties should be willing to settle the dispute by 
agreeing that the generic will enter in five years. Moreover, it 
might seem that the parties could not agree on any other date 
of entry: the patentee would not agree to earlier entry, and the 
generic firm would not agree to delay entry until a later date. 
In such circumstances, the FTC apparently believes that a pure 
term-split settlement, in which the parties agree that the 
generic will enter at that date, is the appropriate settlement. 
The Commission seems to believe that any payment from the 
brand-name manufacturer to the generic manufacturer is 
effectively a payoff or bribe to delay generic entry beyond the 
date of such a (hypothetical) pure term split.35 
In fact, the FTC’s argument is overly simplistic. For one 
thing, a pure term-split settlement may not be feasible. While 
the objective probability that either party will win the suit may 
be 0.5 (fifty percent), each party may be somewhat more 
optimistic about its chances; in formal terms, their subjective 
probabilities may diverge from the objective probabilities. The 
                                                          
PayforDelay_0613.pdf. The paper concludes that “a settlement with a reverse 
payment may in fact allow for entry earlier than might be expected with 
continued litigation, thus benefiting consumers.” Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. The argument in the text does not hinge on the parties’ having equal 
probabilities of success in the litigation. In the discussion above, we assume 
equal probabilities for simplicity only. 
 34. See Addanki, Daskin & Meyer, supra note 31. Another way of stating 
this is that “[l]itigation, therefore, represents a lottery with two possible 
outcomes; the value of the lottery to each firm is simply the mathematical 
expected value—the probability-weighted average—of the values of the two 
outcomes.” Sumanth Addanki & Alan J. Daskin, Patent Settlement 
Agreements, in 3 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION 
LAW AND POLICY 2127, 2133 (2008). 
 35. Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2130–31. 
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patentee (brand-name pharmaceutical company), for example, 
may believe that it has a sixty percent chance (i.e., a 
probability of 0.6) of prevailing, while the would-be generic 
entrant may think that the patentee has only a forty percent 
chance of prevailing (i.e., a probability of 0.4). If each party 
then bases its settlement strategies on its view of the 
(statistically) expected outcome of the litigation, the patentee 
would not agree to allow generic entry in less than six years, 
and the generic firm would not agree to wait more than four 
years before entering. Neither party, it would seem, would 
agree to settle for entry at any time between four and six years. 
In short, a pure term split would not be feasible. 
In reality, however, both parties may consider more than 
simply the expected outcome under litigation. If, as is often the 
case, the patentee earns a substantial fraction of its profits 
from the pharmaceutical in question, it might be particularly 
concerned about an unfavorable outcome: if it loses the 
litigation, the generic firm will enter immediately and the 
brand-name firm’s profits will plummet. In formal terms, the 
patentee may be risk-averse. If so, the brand-name firm might 
be willing to agree to generic entry in, say, four-and-a-half (4.5) 
years. The certainty that generic entry will not be even 
earlier—in the extreme, as soon as the trial ends—may 
compensate for the fact that the generic will enter at a date 
that is earlier than the expected date under litigation.36 
Even so, the generic firm might still be unwilling to wait 
more than four years. If so, a pure term-split settlement would 
still not be feasible. In that case, however, the patentee might 
be willing to offer the would-be entrant a payment to induce it 
to accept a settlement with entry after four-and-a-half years. If 
the parties do in fact agree to such a settlement, (i) there is a 
so-called reverse payment (from the patentee to the potential 
infringer); but (ii) entry will be earlier than the (objective) 
expected date of entry under litigation; so consumers will be 
better off than they would have been had the parties proceeded 
with the litigation.37 
                                                          
 36. Recall that the expected date is a probability-weighted average of the 
possible dates of entry (in this case, a probability-weighted average of entry 
immediately and entry at the expiration of the patent). 
 37. The Supreme Court briefly considers the possible implications of risk 
aversion and then brushes the concern aside without any substantive 
discussion. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (“The owner 
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Even if the parties’ subjective probabilities do coincide with 
the objective probabilities, a reverse-payment settlement may 
be procompetitive. If the parties agree that there is a fifty 
percent chance that either will prevail, the patentee, because of 
risk aversion, may prefer certain entry after, say, four years to 
expected—but uncertain—entry after five years if the parties 
litigate their dispute. The generic firm, of course, would also 
prefer to enter in four years rather than five. But if the would-
be entrant has limited liquidity, it might not be able to wait 
that long; after all, until it enters, it earns no profits on the 
product. Again, a payment by the patentee to the generic firm 
may make it feasible for the parties to agree to a settlement in 
which the generic enters four years from now. In this case, too, 
there is a reverse payment, but consumers benefit from the 
settlement: generic entry occurs in four years, one year earlier 
than expected under litigation.38 
The real world, therefore, is considerably more complicated 
than the simplistic world in which reverse payments 
necessarily imply competitive harm. Although previous 
commentators have advocated for rules similar to the FTC’s 
quick look, a fact-based inquiry into the particular details of 
the settlement in question is required to analyze the 
competitive implication of an agreement.39 
                                                          
of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of course, that even a small 
risk of invalidity justifies a large payment. But, be that as it may, the 
payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of 
competition.”). 
 38. See Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2130–31, app. A at 2139–44, 
for further discussion of these and related issues, including the parties’ 
potentially differing discount rates and views of future market developments. 
 39. Many commentators have advocated for a rule that assumes harm. 
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive 
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1759–60 
(2003) (arguing for presumptive illegality of patent settlements designed to 
delay entry, which in an antitrust context would automatically shift the initial 
burden to the defendant to provide procompetitive justifications of the 
conduct); see also Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent 
Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. 
REV. 747, 785 (2002) (arguing that district courts should consider preliminary 
injunctions and, if they then deny one, apply the “quick look” approach, as the 
settlement is then usually anticompetitive). 
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D. THE COURT SEIZES THE MIDDLE GROUND 
In Actavis, the Supreme Court adopted the rule of reason 
for reverse payment settlements—and, in doing so, rejected the 
primary arguments of both the FTC and Actavis. 
With respect to the FTC’s arguments, the Court stated: 
“The FTC urges us to hold that reverse payment settlement 
agreements are presumptively unlawful and that courts 
reviewing such agreements should proceed via a ‘quick look’ 
approach rather than applying a ‘rule of reason.’ . . . We decline 
to do so.”40 
The Court also explicitly rejected the scope-of-the-patent 
test championed by Actavis and other pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.41 Had the Court endorsed the scope-of-the-
patent test, the FTC effectively would have lost any ability to 
file suit against such settlements. The resulting rule allows the 
FTC to investigate and selectively enforce cases against reverse 
payments. 
The Court sets forth several examples of how reverse 
payments can harm and have harmed consumers by preventing 
competition on the merits and deterring the entry of generic 
drugs.42 The Court notes that reverse payments may, in some 
circumstances, facilitate horizontal collusion between 
competitors or potential competitors in the same market.43 
Thus, the scope-of-the-patent test might have immunized some 
settlements that [would have] harmed consumers. 
The Court lists five reasons why the FTC should be able to 
present its full antitrust case under the rule of reason. Reverse 
payments (1) have the “potential for genuine adverse effects on 
competition;” but (2) concerns about such effects will 
“sometimes prove unjustified;” (3) “where a reverse payment 
threatens to work unjustified anticompetitive harm, the 
patentee likely “possesses the power to bring that harm about 
in practice;” moreover, (4) the rule of reason is administratively 
feasible for courts; and (5) the possibility of antitrust liability 
does not prevent the parties from settling their dispute.44 
                                                          
 40. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 41. Id. at 2230–31. 
 42. Id. at 2232. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 2234–37. 
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III. “STRUCTURING” THE RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS 
OF REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
As it often does, the Court “leave[s] to the lower courts the 
structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”45 
Nevertheless, the Court does indicate some areas that it thinks 
the district courts should focus on: 
[T]he likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about 
anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to 
the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from 
other services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of 
any other convincing justification. The existence and degree of any 
anticompetitive consequence may also vary as among industries.46 
In this section, we provide some commentary on some of 
the issues that the courts should consider in a rule of reason 
analysis of reverse payment settlements. 
A. MONOPOLY POWER 
Any rule of reason analysis has to begin with a monopoly 
power screen. Without some showing that the brand-name firm 
has monopoly power in a relevant antitrust market, a reverse 
payment could not have anticompetitive effects.47 Moreover, 
proper delineation of the relevant market is not always as 
obvious or straightforward as it might seem. In some cases, the 
brand-name pharmaceutical may indeed be able to charge a 
premium price because there are no good therapeutic 
alternatives to constrain its pricing of the drug. In that case, 
the molecule sold by the brand-name firm may constitute the 
                                                          
 45. Id. at 2238 (emphasis added); id. (“[T]rial courts can structure 
antitrust litigation so as to avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust 
theories too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on the other, 
consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the minimal light 
it may shed on the basic question—that of the presence of significant 
unjustified anticompetitive consequences.”); see, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898 (2007) (“As courts gain experience 
considering the effects of these restraints by applying the rule of reason over 
the course of decisions, they can establish the litigation structure to ensure 
the rule operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the market and 
to provide more guidance to businesses.”). 
 46. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 47. Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey P. Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse 
Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-
Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 
116 (2010); see also Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2136 (“If there is no 
monopoly power present, there is no need for any further inquiry; the 
agreement could not be anticompetitive in its effect.”). 
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relevant market, and the brand-name firm may have monopoly 
power. 
In other cases, however, there may be numerous 
therapeutic alternatives to the brand firm’s product. In such 
cases, any price premium that the brand-name product enjoys 
may reflect nothing more than a return on the firm’s 
advertising, medical detailing, and similar efforts.48 If so, the 
relevant market at issue likely extends beyond the molecule 
sold by the brand-name firm, and the firm does not have 
monopoly power. In such a case, no further analysis is needed; 
the agreement is not likely to be anticompetitive. 
It is worth noting in this connection that the FTC has, in 
the past, suggested that any branded drug represents a 
relevant market in its own right.49 In effect, the FTC’s (and 
many private plaintiffs’) argument runs as follows: typically, a 
generic entrant can take substantial sales from the incumbent 
branded drug and the average price falls significantly after 
entry, which, according to the FTC, is “direct evidence” that the 
incumbent must have possessed monopoly power prior to the 
entry.50 
While this argument may appear to have some superficial 
intuitive appeal, it is unusable in the world of pharmaceuticals, 
because it entirely overlooks the institutional characteristics of 
the pharmaceutical industry, in particular, the nature of 
                                                          
 48. Cf. Eric L. Cramer & Daniel Berger, The Superiority of Direct Proof of 
Monopoly Power and Anticompetitive Effects in Antitrust Cases Involving 
Delayed Entry of Generic Drugs, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 81, 118 (2004) (“Product 
heterogeneity and variation in individual patient response to medication are 
factors that create conditions in which product differentiation and 
promotion—in the form of sales calls to physicians (‘detailing’), journal 
advertising, direct to consumer advertising, and drug sampling—often become 
the primary driver of demand for brand-name products.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Complaint Counsel’s Opposition to Upsher-Smith’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 21–22, In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2002). 
 50. See, e.g., id. at 8–24; M. Howard Morse, Product Market Definition in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 633, 667 (2003) (noting that 
two FTC officials have explained the position “that brand-name and generic 
drugs ‘typically are not in the same product market’” and that “‘FTC 
investigations typically have found that because of the significant price 
difference between generic and brand name versions, an increase in the price 
of the brand name version does not lead consumers to switch to the generic 
version, and vice versa’” (quoting David A. Balto & James F. Mongoven, 
Antitrust Enforcement in Pharmaceutical Industry Mergers, 54 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 255, 259 (1999))). Morse then attributes the FTC’s error to the Cellophane 
Fallacy. Id. at 670–75. 
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competition from “AB-Rated Generics.”51 To see this, consider 
two polar cases of generic entry. In the first case, assume that 
the branded drug confers genuine therapeutic advantages over 
any existing formulation, supporting a premium price for that 
drug. Once practitioners are made aware of these advantages, 
the therapeutic benefits will sustain the price premium as long 
as no equivalent substitute product is available. As noted 
above, under these conditions the branded drug could have 
monopoly power (although, of course, the inquiry would not 
stop there). 
In the second case, consider a branded drug that confers no 
material therapeutic benefit over existing alternatives, but 
whose patent covers an alternative (technically unique) 
delivery mechanism, which can be exploited by creative 
marketing and brand-building activities; any price premium 
depends entirely on the brand awareness created by 
advertising and marketing efforts. This is little different from 
branded white bread being more expensive than a private label 
of equal or even greater objective quality: the premium is not a 
reflection of monopoly power, but is merely the economic return 
to advertising/promotional efforts. The problem is that the 
effects of AB-rated generic entry will be similar enough that 
the FTC’s so-called “direct test” will not be able to distinguish 
these two polar cases. The first drug will continue to be 
prescribed for its benefits (as long as no other branded 
substitutes are available) and substitution laws will ensure 
that (a) the generic will be dispensed in place of the brand and 
(b) that the average price paid will fall as a result. In the 
second case, too, prescriptions written for the brand will be 
filled with the generic, again resulting in reduced average 
prices. In both cases, therefore, the conclusion will be that 
                                                          
 51. See Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 415 
(D. Del. 2006) (“Pharmacists may dispense the generic equivalent for a 
branded drug when the branded drug is prescribed by a physician. Such 
substitution is allowed, however, only if the generic drug has been ‘AB-rated’ 
by the FDA, which means not only that the generic drug is bioequivalent to 
the branded drug, but also that the generic has the same form, dosage, and 
strength. Therefore, an approved generic drug that is not AB-rated against a 
currently available branded drug, because, for example, the drugs have 
different formulations or dosages, may not be substituted for the branded drug 
and may only be sold, if at all, as a separately branded, rather than generic, 
drug.” (citations omitted)). 
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there was monopoly power enjoyed by the brand, which is 
obviously incorrect. 
B. DID THE PATENTEE ACTUALLY MAKE A REVERSE PAYMENT? 
In some cases, what looks like a reverse payment may be 
nothing of the sort. Pharmaceutical companies often enter into 
multiple agreements at the same time. While settling on a 
mutually agreeable date for generic entry, for example, the 
brand-name firm may buy from the generic firm the right to 
sell a different drug.52 If so, a payment will flow from the 
patentee to the generic firm, but there can be no presumption 
that it is a reverse payment: that payment does not necessarily 
have anything to do with the settlement of the patent 
infringement suit.53 To be sure, if the patentee pays an 
artificially inflated price for the right to sell the second drug, 
the payment may be designed to conceal what is in fact a 
reverse payment. But a fact-based inquiry would be required to 
establish that fact.54 
In Actavis, the Court clearly recognized the need for 
consideration of the possibility that the alleged reverse 
payment is not anticompetitive: 
The reverse payment, for example, may amount to no more than a 
rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved through the 
settlement. That payment may reflect compensation for other 
services that the generic has promised to perform—such as 
distributing the patented item or helping to develop a market for 
that item. There may be other justifications. Where a reverse 
payment reflects traditional settlement considerations, such as 
                                                          
 52. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (“Schering and Upsher entered settlement discussions. During 
these discussions, Schering refused to pay Upsher to simply ‘stay off the 
market,’ and proposed a compromise on the entry date of Klor Con . . . . 
Although still opposed to paying Upsher for holding Klor Con’s release date, 
Schering agreed to a separate deal to license other Upsher products.”). 
 53. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New 
Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 
641 (2009) (“If settlement and delay occur as part of a larger set of 
transactions between the two firms, how do we know that the payment was 
made in exchange for delay, rather than for some other valuable 
consideration? Often, this is a difficult question.”). 
 54. Kenneth Glazer & Jenée Desmond-Harris, Reverse Payments: Hard 
Cases Even Under Good Law, ANTITRUST, Spring 2010, at 14, 19 (“Just 
because a thing of value was given to the generic company does not 
necessarily mean that that thing of value was in return for an agreement to 
delay. The nexus would still need to be shown.”). 
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avoided litigation costs or fair value for services, there is not the 
same concern that a patentee is using its monopoly profits to avoid 
the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement. In 
such cases, the parties may have provided for a reverse payment 
without having sought or brought about the anticompetitive 
consequences we mentioned above. But that possibility does not 
justify dismissing the FTC’s complaint. An antitrust defendant may 
show in the antitrust proceeding that legitimate justifications are 
present, thereby explaining the presence of the challenged term and 
showing the lawfulness of that term under the rule of reason.55 
The Court’s recognition that some payments that appear to 
be reverse payments are, in fact, not payments that might lead 
to concern about anticompetitive effects is an important 
justification for applying the rule of reason to the entire 
category of transactions. 
C. THE SIZE OF THE REVERSE PAYMENT, MARKET POWER, AND 
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS 
In Actavis, the Court suggested a shortcut for proving 
market power: 
At least, the “size of the payment from a branded drug 
manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself a strong indicator of 
power”—namely, the power to charge prices higher than the 
competitive level. An important patent itself helps to assure such 
power. Neither is a firm without that power likely to pay “large 
sums” to induce “others to stay out of its market.” In any event, the 
Commission has referred to studies showing that reverse payment 
agreements are associated with the presence of higher-than-
competitive profits—a strong indication of market power.56 
The relative size of the reverse payment can be an 
indicator of the anticompetitive nature of the deal. As a matter 
of economics, the Supreme Court placed unwarranted emphasis 
on this factor, but under certain conditions it can be an 
indicator of harm. Those conditions include (1) settlements 
where the payment makes up a large portion of the patent 
holder’s monopoly rents; (2) where the generic is being paid 
more than it would make from entry into the market; and (3) 
where the payment is significantly larger than the costs of 
litigation.57 However, this indicator is not a substitute for proof 
of monopoly power. 
                                                          
 55. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013). 
 56. Id. (citations omitted). 
 57. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 47, at 117–18 (arguing that reverse 
payments that set arbitrary numerical limits do not accurately reflect a sound 
economic rule of reason approach). 
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D. CONSIDERATIONS OF PATENT STRENGTH 
One essential element of the rule of reason inquiry is to 
evaluate, at least to a first approximation, the likelihood of 
success in the patent infringement suit.58 This may involve 
consideration of traditional doctrinal patent requirements such 
as newness, non-obviousness, the level of scrutiny that the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office gave the patent, and the result of 
past litigation over the patent.59 When the patent is considered 
strong, there is a higher likelihood that the patent holder 
would have prevailed at trial, making the settlement 
procompetitive or benign. A weak patent may indicate that any 
settlement is anticompetitive.60 
Many commentators, lawyers, and agency sources have 
reluctantly agreed that a comprehensive antitrust examination 
requires an evaluation of patent strength. Carl Shapiro has 
written that, 
[T]o compare consumer surplus under a settlement with consumer 
surplus from ongoing litigation requires an informed judgment as to 
the strength of the patent(s) at issue. If the patent is very strong, 
i.e., very likely to be found valid and infringed and difficult to invent 
around, the challenger is unlikely to offer much independent 
competition to the patentholder if litigation proceeds.61 
He concludes that “there does not appear to be any way 
around the need to assess patent strength directly if one is 
trying to determine whether a settlement benefits 
consumers.”62 At one time the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
also supported this position.63 The DOJ, however, flipped its 
                                                          
 58. Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2137. 
 59. As one example, consider the facts of Tamoxifen, where the patent at 
issue had already been invalidated by a district court and the settlement 
revoked that invalidation through the use of vacatur. In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2006). A challenge to the 
settlement could likely presume a very weak patent since the issue had 
already been litigated. 
 60. Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2137. Addanki and Daskin go on 
to indicate that this does not mean that there needs to be a complete patent 
validity lawsuit. They contend that the court would need to determine “the 
objective odds that each party will prevail in the litigation, not the parties’ 
subjective estimates of those odds . . . . [I]t is not generally necessary to 
estimate those odds with tremendous precision.” Id. 
 61. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. 
ECON. 391, 397 (2003). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Joblove v. 
Barr Labs., Inc., 549 U.S. 1277 (2007) (No. 06-830), 2007 WL 1511527. 
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view and supported instead the quick look approach in the 
Arkansas Carpenters case.64 
Although a complicated inquiry, this result is required and 
supported by the court’s opinion because the anticompetitive 
nature of reverse payments is not at all obvious from a mere 
quick look. As Addanki and Daskin, in an apparently counter-
intuitive insight, have articulated: 
Agreements that involve reverse payments may, in fact, be 
procompetitive relative to litigation, while apparently innocuous 
agreements that involve no such payments may, in fact, be 
anticompetitive relative to the litigation alternative. There is, 
therefore, no substitute for closer, fact-specific analysis of the 
agreement and its context.65 
This reasoning emphasizes that—unlike what the Court 
believes—the rule of reason is almost never efficient. 
Determining the likely competitive effects in a market and the 
outcome any settlement will have on consumers is inherently 
difficult and requiring of a detailed and extended analysis into 
market factors. Reverse payments, especially as they are 
burdened by undetermined and complicated questions of patent 
strength and validity, are certainly no exception. 
That being said, the burden in the antitrust inquiry may 
be much lower than many commentators—including the FTC—
have suggested. That is because for every such settlement 
agreement, there is a federal judge who has acquired 
considerable knowledge of the merits of the underlying patent 
case and, more often than not, has construed the claims of the 
patent in a Markman ruling.66 It seems entirely likely that a 
judge in that position has more than enough information about 
the underlying patent suit to have an informed judgment of the 
strength of the patent, certainly enough to be able to judge—
aided by expert analysis if necessary—whether a given 
settlement of that suit is likely to benefit consumers. 
                                                          
 64. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 47, at 86 n.181 (quoting Brief for the 
United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 21–27, Ark. Carpenters 
Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer, AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 05-
2851-cv(L), 05-2852-cv (CON)), 2009 WL 2429249). 
 65. Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2138. 
 66. For a discussion of Markman hearings and the role of federal judges 
in patent litigation, see Vincent P. Kovalick, Markman Hearings and Their 
Critical Role in U.S. Patent Litigation, FINNEGAN, http://www.finnegan.com/
resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=9a8bf39b-c419-4329-9f6a-
08ac0a647c7c (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
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E. COMPETITIVE EFFECTS—BEYOND PRICES 
Assuming that monopoly power exists, the appropriate 
antitrust test then becomes an inquiry into competitive effects 
to determine “whether customers are better off under the 
settlement than they would have been (in expectational terms) 
under litigation” which is to ask “whether the settlement 
resulted in an agreed-upon entry date later than what might 
have been expected under litigation.”67 
What motivates the concern about generic entry dates is, of 
course, the expectation that prices will fall upon generic entry 
and, obviously, earlier entry usually results in lower prices. 
However, it is important to recognize that lower price is not a 
perfect indicator of consumer welfare. Lower prices caused by 
generic entry destroy the name brand manufacturer’s incentive 
to invest in advertising and other marketing activities that 
provide valuable information to physicians and their patients.68 
The result could be (and often is) reduced sales of the drug at 
the lower prices because many doctors and patients will not be 
made aware of the benefits of the drug.69 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ever since the Eleventh Circuit first articulated its scope-
of-the-patent test, the debate about reverse payment 
settlements has been strident and polarized. In effect, each side 
of that disagreement has urged that these settlements 
presumptively are either legal or illegal. In fact, however, there 
is no economic support for either extreme position. In choosing 
the middle ground by ruling that the settlements are properly 
analyzed under the rule of reason, the Supreme Court has 
rightly affirmed that whether or not a given settlement is 
anticompetitive, procompetitive or competitively neutral is 
ultimately a fact-specific inquiry. Some of the factors that will 
inevitably need to be addressed in such analyses include 
                                                          
 67. Addanki & Daskin, supra note 34, at 2136. 
 68. See Cramer & Berger, supra note 48, at 124–25 (“As generics enter, 
the usual response by the branded seller is to cease its marketing efforts for 
that product and switch promotional efforts to a new brand-name product.”). 
 69. See id. at 125 (“[B]ecause the branded firm’s efforts to build and 
maintain prescription volume ceases, and because generics typically do little 
advertising or promotion, the emergence of generic entry correlates with a 
plateauing of growth, or sometimes even a slight unit sales volume decline in 
the specific drug molecule, despite the substantially lower average price.”). 
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monopoly power, the characteristics and strength of the 
patent(s) at issue, the extent of the reverse payment, if any, the 
likely effect of the agreement on output and prices, and other 
considerations that often enter into rule of reason inquiries. 
Although such analyses can be burdensome and time 
consuming in some cases, in other situations threshold 
questions about monopoly power and patent strength may well 
prove pivotal and thereby obviate the need for an extended, 
full-blown rule of reason case. 
